This is the second part of an article regarding the Conflict in Darfur, of the series “Understanding Darfur”. It resume a collection of articles i wrote about this conflict.
Darfur (which means the land of the Fur, after the name of one of its largest ethnic groups) is located in the western and northwestern part of Sudan, mostly alongside its borders with Chad and the Central African Republic. Although roughly the size of France, it covers only one fifth of Sudan and a large part of its territory is desert or semi-desert. Above all, it is the poorest part of Sudan and lacks the most basic infrastructure, particularly roads and transport.
Due to its remote location and poverty, Darfur was largely unaffected by the civil war during most of its duration, if only because the fighting took place around the more prosperous parts of central and southern Sudan and around the areas designated as potential oil fields – and there is only one big oil concession in Darfur, located in its south.
Besides, due to its poverty and rural backwardness, the Sudanese regime was never too interested in Darfur. In the absence of any visible local opposition, the regime’s stranglehold over the province was less heavy-handed than in many other parts of the country. The vicious “Islamization” campaigns, for instance, were never seriously enforced. And although all Darfurians are traditionally Muslims, many of them carried on with their own traditional version of Islam, which included the use of locally-brewed beers as a food staple and a relative equality for women. In short, Darfur enjoyed, by and large, a relative autonomy from the vagaries of Khartoum’s politicians – at least until 2001 or so, when the regime began to tighten its grip against an increasingly vocal discontent.
The people originating from Darfur were not designated “Arabic” – meaning that they did not come from the immediate surroundings of the Nile river. Even though they were considered citizens according to the “sharia” (since they are Muslims), they were discriminated against, like all the other non-”Arabic” peoples in Sudan. People from Darfur, for example, hardly stood a chance of making a career in the top spheres of the state. In the army, for example, there were no senior officers originating from Darfur, even though around half of the ranks up through the non-commissioned officer level were from that province.
Given this discrimination, those members of the small Darfurian elite who went to Khartoum to make a career faced an uncomfortable alternative: either they joined the ruling fundamentalist NCP in order to benefit from its network of patronage (which many did) or else they joined the underground opposition in Sudan. Or – as was often the case – they went into exilein the hope that a regime change would offer them better opportunities. Discrimination maintained a smoldering discontent among the elites, which was bound to lead to the emergence of a Darfurian opposition.
This opposition emerged when Darfur found itself involved in two regional wars, which it would never have been sucked into had it not been for external factors.
One of these was the civil war in Chad, where various warlords were fighting for power. The warlord Idriss Deby, who is today Chad’s president and one of France’s closest allies in the region, happened to belong to an ethnic group which was split by the border between Chad and Darfur. As a result, Deby used Darfur as a rear base and a recruitment pool for his troops until, finally, he launched a successful offensive from Darfur which took him to power in 1990. Many Darfurians who had been involved in this military venture went over to Chad with Deby. But they eventually returned to Darfur with increased expectations and the conviction that what was needed to change things there was an armed rebellion.
The other war in which Darfur found itself involved, was of course, Khartoum’s war with the South. This was not because SPLA troops tried to establish themselves in Darfur – which they had no reason to do. Rather it was because throughout the 1990s the Khartoum regime decided to arm certain ethnic groups to use them as auxiliaries to help the army fight the SPLA outside Darfur. Since the regime wanted a low-cost auxiliary force, as a reward it sometimes offered these militiamen the land of a deceased farmer, regardless of the family’s rights on the land. In most cases, the militiamen were just left to use their weapons and get their payment from the population – something which they continued to do when they came back to Darfur.
Some commentators claim, as they have done many times in the past when dealing with African wars, that the conflict in Darfur is ethnic-based or that it is a conflict between “Arab” nomadic groups – who form the so-called “janjaweed” militias, responsible for a large number of the recent massacres – and “African” farmers. In fact, this is nonsense. First, because everyone in Darfur is of African origin, including those described as “ethnic Arabs.” All are part of a population, which, at times nomadic, may have wandered as far as Egypt a very long time ago. And second, because over the past century if not longer, the distinction between the various ethnic groups, on the one hand, and between nomads and farmers, on the other, has become increasingly blurred by intermarriage and economic interdependence. While the Sudanese army certainly tried to fuel ethnic resentment by targeting particular ethnic groups in their recruitment drives, they managed only to recruit the poorest among them, those who had neither family to look after, nor cattle, nor farm – in short, those who had nothing to lose and were desperate enough to see an automatic weapon and a license to kill as a legitimate means of survival.
Having called upon these ad hoc militias in the 1990s in order to fight the SPLA outside Darfur, it was easy for Khartoum to call upon them once again when a new rebellion emerged, this time in Darfur itself. By bombing villages and using the janjaweed to terrorize the populations and force them to flee for their lives, the Sudanese regime hoped to deprive the rebellion of its base of support. In this case, however, the attempt did not work. The conflict went on and the SPLA started revenging every attack.
The crisis in Darfur dragged on for a long time. And yet, from a purely practical point of view, the most immediate needs of the local population could be met relatively easily. Hundreds of thousands of people are desperately hungry. The newly-born, the aged and the sick are dying at an alarming rate. Some reports give figures approaching 2000 deaths per day. Why is food not being provided? The argument was that “bad roads” and the actions of “armed bands” have supposedly prevented food and supplies from reaching the camps. The fact is that food, water, shelter and medical care could easily be brought into the camps by freight aircraft and helicopters. In 2003, in a matter of just a few weeks, the American and British governments transported over 250,000 military personnel, complete with tanks, vehicles, aircraft and an entire “military support industry” into position for the invasion of Iraq. Is it not possible to get a few thousand tons of supplies into Darfur? What the US administration did was that it moved quickly to brand the conflict with titles such as “ethnic cleansing” and “genocide” in order to use the plight of the Darfur tribes, as an argument for the blockading of the country.
Western governments have donated very little money, and even less has actually been used to relieve the victims of famine and violence in Darfur.
In fact, all this phoney “humanitarian” concern on the part of Western government(mainly US & UK)– who have never hesitated, as in Iraq, to inflict suffering and death when the interests of their “business communities” are at stake – is really about imperialist greed for profits and oil. American imperialism, in particular, is trying to use the plight of the Darfur peoples in order to obtain a trade embargo against Sudan, in order to cut off access to Sudanese oil fields to their main rivals in that industry and in that part of the world. The embargo threat is essentially directed against China, France, India and Malaya, all of which have oil interests in Sudan. At the same time, it is being used as a means of increasing pressure on the Sudanese government and strengthening the military and strategic position of the United States in that part of the world. To the northeast of Sudan lie the Red Sea and the strategically vital oil terminals on Saudi Arabia’s western coastline.
The intense pressure being applied for the imposition of an international embargo against Sudan is proof enough of the completely hypocritical character of the “humanitarian” propaganda of the American administration. The consequences of such an embargo would be to plunge the entire population of Sudan into a situation similar to that which exists in Darfur. Sudan is an extremely backward country. Even without the devastating consequences of an embargo, the vast majority of the people are desperately poor. An international embargo would mean nothing less than mass starvation.
For the meantime, the Darfur crisis will be kept on the boil, as a convenient excuse for sanctions against Sudan and for strengthening the presence of foreign troops in the Darfur region. The “scramble for Africa” by the great powers continues, and the people of Sudan and the rest of the continent are still paying the price, in terms of famine, sickness, and death.
Tags:
Africa,
Darfur,
Sudan,
Understanding AfricaPosted by Darko on July 6th, 2008 -
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